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BROKERS' LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF
EXCHANGE AND NASD RULES
HARRY N. MACLEAN*
In this timely article, the author offers insight into an expanding
area of securities litigation: recovery for violations of rules promul-
gated not by the Securities and Exchange Commission but by non-
governmental self-regulatory bodies. MacLean summarizes the statutory
framework of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, discusses the
recent case law, and concludes with an analysis of the policy and
rationale behind the self-regulatory scheme.
INTRODUCTION
V HEN the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari' in the case
of Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc..' it
left standing a decision upholding a cause of action against a brok-
erage firm based on a violation of a New York Stock Exchange rule.
The contra result was reached in Mercury Investment Co. v. A. G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc.,3 where the district court dismissed that portion
of the complaint alleging a violation by the broker of a rule of the
National Association of Securities Dealers.4 These two decisions
indicate the present state of judicial uncertainty concerning a vital
issue in the area of civil liabilities in the securities business.
While it is settled that civil actions lie for violation of the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws and rules passed thereunder,5
there are many rules adopted by the self-regulatory agencies in the
securities industry which proscribe conduct falling far short of fraud.6
Simply stated, the issue is: Can an aggrieved customer sue a broker-
dealer in federal court for violation of a rule of one of the self-
*Partner, Cunningham & MacLean; J.D., University of Denver, 1967.
1396 U.S. 838 (1969).
2 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969). Plaintiff sued a brokerage firm for inter alia violation of
the "know your customer" rule of the NYSE. See n. 38 infra for a discussion of the
"know your customer" rule.
3 295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Texas 1969). Plaintiff sued for violation of the "suitability
rule" of the NASD. See n. 6 infra for discussion of the suitability rule.
4 Id. at 1163.
5 See discussion of cases in III Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1763-97 (1961); VI Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATiON 3869 (1969 Supplement to Vol. III).
6 One example of such a rule is the NASD "suitability rule" which states that: "In recom-
mending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall
have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such
customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other
security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs." NASD Rules of Fair
Practice, Article III § 2. A discussion of this rule in light of the standards and practices
of the brokerage community is found in Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of
Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L. J. 445.
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regulatory bodies to which that broker-dealer belongs? If so, can the
customer sue for a violation of any of the rules or just specific ones?
The ultimate disposition of these questions not only affects the civil
liabilities of broker-dealers but also the future role of the self-regulatory
bodies in the regulation of the securities industry. This article will deal
with these questions in terms of the statutory framework of the secur-
ities laws, an analysis of the case law, and an examination of the
function of the self-regulatory bodies. Finally, the effect that civil
liability under these rules would have upon the securities industry
will be considered.
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
It would seem logical to analyze the statutory structure of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in hope of finding a definitive answer
to the question of civil liability for violation of exchange or NASD
rules. This has been done in detail7 and the results do not appear
conclusive or even persuasive. The only statement that can be made
with confidence is that the Act does not contain a clear grant of a
private right of action for violation of association or exchange rules
and the courts which have found such rights have relied primarily on
policy grounds or interpretation of Congressional intent. 8 For these
reasons, this examination will consider only briefly some of the sec-
tions of the Act which have been relied on to give force to arguments
on either side of the issue.
Section 27 of the Act sets forth the jurisdiction and venue re-
quirements for suits under the Act,9 and much of the statutory argu-
ment for imposition of civil liabilities rests upon an interpretation
of a particular phrase therein stating that the district courts shall
have "exclusive jurisdiction . . . of all suits in equity and actions at
law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter
or the rules and regulations thereunder."' 0 It seems clear to at least
one author that the rules passed by the NASD and the exchanges
are "rules and regulations passed thereunder," and even if they
are not, they could be considered to be a "duty created by this
chapter."" It would seem equally arguable, however, that the phrase
"rules and regulations" refers only to such rules and regulations
7 Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets: Implied
Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L. Q. 633, 635-50 (1966); Shipman,
Two Current Questions Concerning Implied Private Rights of Action Under the Exchange
Act: Authority of the Administrative Agency to Negate; Existence for Violation of Self-
Regulatory Requirements, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 925, 964-70 (1966).
8 See text, § II for discussion of the cases.
9 Securities Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
10 Id.




passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to Section 23
of the Act' 2 and the "duty" mentioned refers to the duty of the
associations and exchanges to pass rules and enforce them through
disciplinary actions against their members. In any event, no authority
has been cited for the proposition that it was the intention of
Congress in the use of the above phrase to include the rules and
regulations passed by the registered securities associations and ex-
changes.
Secondly, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for the
registration of stock exchanges and national securities associations.13
It is argued that because of this registration requirement and the fact
that the Commission must approve the rules of the securities asso-
ciations14 and exchanges 15 prior to registration, these rules are, in
fact, the rules of the SEC. This idea is further supported by the fact
that the SEC must give prior approval to any change of existing
association rules16 and can abrogate the rules of the association if it
12Securities Exchange Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1964).
'3 Section 5 of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 78e (1964)) requires that all exchanges engaging in
interstate commerce must register under Section 6 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1964),
An exchange must file an agreement to comply and enforce compliance among its members
with the Act and of the Securities and Exchange Commission rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)
(1) (1964). Section 6(b) of the Act requires that for registration to be granted and to
remain in force the rules of the exchange shall "include provision for the expulsion,
suspension or disciplining of a member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just
and equitable principles of trade .... .. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1964). Section 6(c)
provides that nothing in the Exchange Act precludes an exchange from "adopting and
enforcing any rule not inconsistent with this chapter and the rules and regulations there-
under .... .. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (1964). Section 6(d) provides that the Commission
shall grant the registration if it appears that the exchange will be able to comply with
the provisions of the Act and the rules thereunder and if "the rules of the exchange
are just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors .... .. 15 U.S.C,
§ 78f(d) (1964). The Commission also has the authority to suspend or withdraw an
exchange registration, (15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(1) (1964)) and to alter or supplement
exchange rules in certain specific areas. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964).
The Maloney Act (15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1964)) was passed in 1938 to provide
for comparable self-regulation in the over-the-counter market and provides for the
registration of national securities associations with the Commission requiring, among
other things, that:
-[T]he rules of the association [be] designed to prevent fraudulent and manipula-
tive acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade . . . and, in
general, to protect investors and the public interest . 15 U.S.C. § 780- 3(b)(8)
(1964).
In addition, the association must have adequate procedures for fining, censuring,
suspending or expelling its members for violation of its rules. 15 U.S.C. § 780- 3(b)
(9) (1964). The Commission has the authority to abrogate any rule of an association
if the requisite findings are made (15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k)(1) (1964)) and to suspend
the registration of an association if necessary in the public interest. 15 U.S.C. § 78o - 3
(1) (1964). To date, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) is the
only association registered pursuant to the Act, and its membership consists of most of
the broker-dealers in the country. Many NASD members are also members of one or
more exchanges, and brokers who are not are still subject to regulation by virtue of the
1964 amendments. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(10) (1964).
1 4 Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 780 - 3(b) (1964).
15 Securities Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1964).
16 Securities Exchange Act § 15A(j), 15 U.S.C. § 78o- 3(j) (1964).
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is necessary "to assure fair dealing by the members of such asso-
ciation ... or otherwise to protect investors or effectuate the purpose
of this chapter.' 17 Since suits can be brought for violation of SEC
rules, then they should be able to be brought for violation of NASD
rules.' This limited view of the NASD as merely an extension or
alter-ego of the SEC with little independent responsibility or initiative
would undoubtedly be contested by the NASD. 9 This view is also
contrary to the basic theory of self-regulation in the securities industry,
as explained in a later section of this article,2 ° which holds that it
is to the advantage of the regulators, the regulated, and the investing
public, for the regulated to assume primary responsibility for the
conduct of its members, with the residual power to override vested
in the SEC if such self-regulation is considered inadequate.
II. THE CASES
Considerable confusion in the consideration of the case law in
this area can be avoided by distinguishing the cases involving civil suits
against stock exchanges. It is fairly well settled that a cause of action
against an exchange for failure to enforce its rules will be upheld.2"
This result is based on the reasoning that an investor may sue to enforce
a duty imposed by statute and is consistent with the opinion in J. I. Case
Co. v. Borak22 and other cases implying that one for whose benefit or
protection a statute is passed may sue for violation of the duty required
17 Securities Exchange Act § 15A(k) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o- 3(k) (1) (1964).
18Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets: Implied
Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L. Q. 633 (1966). The writer concludes:
"Where the SEC has such sweeping powers over association rules, these rules are virtually
rules of the SEC itself, and should grant the same rights to investors as SEC rules grant."
Id. at 636.
19 In any event, the NASD has felt independent enough to sue the SEC in Federal cou:z.
National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n. 420 F.2d 83 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92, 438.
20 See text, § III infra.
21 It was held in Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) cert. denied 323 U.S. 737
(1944), that the New York Stock Exchange violated Section 6(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act when it failed to expel a member who had violated the rules of the
exchange in the conversion of its customers' securities (recovery was denied since
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that such failure was the proximate cause of their
injuries). In Butterman v. Walston & Co., 387 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1967) plaintiffs
alleged that the New York Stock Exchange violated its rules in not expelling a registered
representative of Walston & Co. In dismissing the complaint against the exchange on the
grounds that the exchange had no duty to enforce its rules unless it had knowledge of
the improper conduct, the clear implication is that the court recognized the right of an
individual to such an exchange for failure to enforce its rules.
377 U.S. 426 (1964). Borak, as a Case stockholder, sued the company to void a merger
and obtain damages alleging among other things violations of the proxy rules passed by
the Commission. The Court, in affirming the claim for relief, stated: "It appears clear
that private parties have a right under § 27 to bring suit for violation of § 14(a) of
the Act. Indeed, this section specifically grants the appropriate district courts jurisdiction
over 'all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liabilities or duty
created under the Act.' " Id. at 430-31. See Comment. Private Rights and Federal
Remedies: Herein of J.1. Case v. Borak, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1150 (1965).
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by that statute. 23 The statutory duty involved here is to pass rules
promoting just and equitable principles of trade and to discipline
members for the violation thereof. Thus, this theory would allow a
suit against the NASD or an exchange for failure to pass or enforce
adequate rules or against the SEC for failure to abrogate or supple-
ment existing ones.
The first case to deal directly with the issue of whether a
brokerage firm could be held liable to a customer for a violation
of an exchange or NASD rule was Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache. 4
The plaintiff in Colonial alleged a violation of Article XIV, Section 6 of
the New York Stock Exchange Constitution 2a and Article III, Section
1 of the Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD.26 The lower court dis-
missed the federal claim 27  indicating that violation of association
exchange rules do not give rise to suits in federal courts. The
second circuit upheld the dismissal, but only after analyzing the
rule thoroughly, creating a test requiring a judicial investigation
of the particular rule involved and its function in the over-all scheme
of securities regulation as provided for in the 1934 Act.2 8
23 See 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS, 934-36 (1961) and the cases and articles cited
therein. The statutory tort theory is explained by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
as follows:
"The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose
purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose
interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has
resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against that particular hazard from which
the harm results."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). See generally Note, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 285 (1963).
24 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966). In Colonial, a customer brought suit against a brokerage
firm alleging that the firm violated an oral agreement not to sell the securities in
plaintiff's margin account unless necessary to meet the minimum margin requirements of
the New York Stock Exchange.
251 d. at 180. This rule states that: "A member . . . who . . . shall be adjudged guilty . . .
of conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade may be
suspended or expelled as the Board may determine." New York Stock Exchange Constitu-
tion Art. XIV § 6, CCH New York Stock Exchange Guide.
26 This rule states that: "A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade." National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Rules of Fair Practice Art. III § 1.
27 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache& Co., 358 F.2d 178, 180 (2nd Cir. 1966).
28 What emerges is that whether the courts are to imply federal civil liability for violation
of exchange or dealer association rules by a member cannot be determined on the
simplistic all-or-nothing basis urged by the two parties; rather the court must look to the
nature of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme, with the party urging
the implication of a federal liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion
than when the violation is of the statute or an SEC regulation. Id. at 182.
1970
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It is important to note that there was no specific reliance on an
interpretation of Section 27 of the Act in adopting this flexible test.
The court relied instead on its understanding of the regulation of the
securities industry and the function of self-regulation.29 The court
stated that "the difficulty [in determining civil liability] lies in the
scope of the unique statutory scheme of supervised self-regulation
by exchanges and dealers' associations. ' °30 However, the court then
adopts the rationale of the "substitute rule" stating: [W]e cannot
ignore that the concept of supervised self-regulation is broad enough
to encompass a rule which provides what amounts to a substitute for
regulation by the SEC itself."3" The opinion then indicated that the
court would not say that there could never be a basis for implying
a private right of action based on an exchange or association rule."
The concept underlying the flexible test adopted by the court
appears to be that self-regulation is not really a separate approach
in itself but rather is merely one aspect of attempting to achieve
investor protection sanctioned by the SEC. If this concept is accurate,
there is no reason for denying association and exchange rules the
same status as those of the SEC.
The court then limited the effect of this concept by denying
civil liability for violation of the rules prohibiting conduct which is
"inconsistent with fair and equitable principles of trade. ' 33 In the
court's opinion, the scope of these rules includes "unethical behavior
which Congress could well not have intended to give rise to a legal
claim' ' 4 and that there was no reason to believe that merely by
requiring adoption of rules assuring fair and equitable conduct
"Congress meant to impose a new legal standard on members dif-




31 Id. at 182. The rationale of the so-called "'substitute rule" is that the investor should not
be deprived of a private right of action in an instance when the SEC has not adopted
a particular rule in deference to the exchange adopting the rule. The court in Colonial
cites Lowenfels, Implied Liability Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
12, 17 (1966) commenting with approval: "The author points out that, doubtless because
of the exchange rules, the SEC terminated a rule-making procedure of its own." Id. at
182 n.4.
3 If an exchange or association rule plays an "integral part in SEC regulation notwith-
standing the Commission's decision to take a backseat role in its promulgation and
enforcement, (the court) would not wish to say that such a rule could not provide the






court states that to allow federal civil liability would disrupt the
present system of adjudication of customer claims.3 6
In the application of this test, the above considerations would
appear to exclude the "suitability" rule of the NASD 7  and
the "know your customer" rule of the New York Stock Exchange,"8
both of which deal with the recommendation of securities to customers
based on knowledge of the customer's financial situation. Phrases
such as "reasonable care," "due diligence," and "suitable" certainly
encompass negligence or unethical conduct, and the court in Hecht
v. Harris, Upham & Co.,"9 in applying the Colonial test to the suit-
ability rule, rejected it stating:
Conceivably, a broker might honestly think that his "ground" for
believing his recommendation "suitable" is "reasonable" only to find
himself overruled in a lawsuit and found guilty of fraud notwith-
standing his good faith. As pointed out by Friendly, J., in Colonial,
p. 182, the practical consequences of allowing private federal damage
suits based on rules of this kind, and involving judicial review of
market judgments, would be considerable.
40
The court also stated that the securities acts are essentially di-
rected at fraud- not against mere negligence or errors of judgment
on the part of the brokers.4 '
In Mercury Investment Co. v. A. G. Edwards & Sons,42 the court
dismissed the claim based on a violation of the suitability rule, relying
specifically on the Hecht interpretation of the Colonial test.
Adopting the reasoning of Hecht, the Court must conclude that Article
III, Sec. 2 of the N.A.S.D. rules seek to regulate a much broader
36 The court then gives several examples in which this might be the case: The arbitration
procedures now in common use to settle disputes between brokers and customers could
be avoided whenever the customers chose to rely on a violation of "fair and equitable"
conduct rather than negligence or breach of contract. Id. Additionally, "mere recitation
of the statutory watchword by an aggrieved investor, would saddle the federal courts with
garden-variety customer-broker suits, [and Congress could scarcely have] contemplated
judicial creation of a new body of federal broker-customer law whenever a complaint
in what would otherwise be an action under state law alleged conduct inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade. Id. at 183. Finally, "if § 27 were read to include
exchange rules, the jurisdiction of the federal courts would be exclusive .. .and the
state courts would be altogether stripped of power to adjudicate claims so pleaded even
between their own citizens." Id.
37 See note 6, supra.
38 New York Stock Exchange Rule 405, CCH New York Stock Exchange Guide 2405.
This rule provides in part that: "Every member organization is required through a general
partner or an officer who is a holder of voting stock to (1) use due diligence to learn
the essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account
accepted or carried by such organization and evey person holding power of attorney over
any account accepted or carried by such organization." Id.
39 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Calif. 1968). The complaint essentially charged "churning" or
excessive trading in plaintiff's account by the registered representative of Harris. Upham
and also alleged a violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lob-5 thereunder. Id. at 422.
40 Id. at 431.
41 Id.
42 295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Texas 1969). The plaintiff in Mercury sought damage against
the employee and brokerage firm for alleged violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, as well as the "suitability rule." Id. at 1161.
1970
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spectrum of broker activities than is envisioned by security regulations.
Thus a violation of this N.A.S.D. rule per se does not give rise to
federal civil liabilities. .... 4
Interestingly, the Court did state that a violation of the rule would
be admissible as evidence of negligence.
44
This trend in interpreting the Colonial test to deny civil suits
based on rules that encompass unethical or negligent conduct appears
to be interrupted by two cases which allowed the claim without an
independent consideration of the issue, 5 and more importantly by
the court in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.46
The plaintiff in Buttrey, a trustee in bankruptcy of a brokerage
firm, alleged a violation of NYSE Rule 40517 in that defendant
Merrill Lynch allowed the firm to open cash and margin accounts
and to engage in speculative trading techniques without making
adequate investigation into the financial status of the firm when it
had grounds, by reason of past experience, to suspect that the firm
was not in good financial condition. In upholding the lower court's
refusal to dismiss this claim, the court relied in part on the reasoning
of Colonial, in part on the reasoning of Hecht, and in part on the
test set forth by Lowenfels,4 8 to reach a conclusion essentially distinct
from all three.4" The court "did not decide that an alleged violation
43 1d. at 1163.
44 "But the Court reiterates that violations of Art. III, Sec. 2, would be admissible as
evidence of negligence, if any." Id.
45 Avern Trust v. Clarke, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,441 at p. 98096 (7th Cir. 1969).
The plaintiff sued the brokerage firm alleging violation of the anti-fraud provisions and
Sections 1, 2 and 18 of Art. III of the Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD in regard
to the purchase of securities from the firm in an underwriting. The lower court had
dismissed the claim based on a violation of the NASD rules, and the Circuit Court relied
on its holding on Buttrey in concluding that the lower court had erroneously dismissed
the claim. The court held, however, that the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the dismissal
since "the same theory was incorporated under the claim for violation of Section 15 of
the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o." Id. at p. 98,099. In Stevens v. Abbott,
Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968), the plaintiff sued the brokerage
firm and its employee alleging churning and excessive trading. With no discussion, the
court held: "The court finds that the defendants' conduct represents violations of the
rules of fair practice of the N.A.S.D.; that plaintiff's account was not properly supervised
in accordance with paragraph 2 of Rule 435 of the Rules of the New York Stock
Exchange; and that her account was not properly supervised as required by Rule 405 of
the New York Stock Exchange." Id. at 846-47.
46410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969).
47 See note 38, supra.
48 Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
12, 24-25 (1966). Simply stated, exchange rules which are promulgated for the direct
protection of the investing public should give rise to private actions against an exchange
and other private parties, while rules promulgated merely as "housekeeping" devices to
guide the membership should not." Id. In regard to NASD rules, Lowenfels urges the
same test. Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets:
Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 COR.NELL L.Q. 633, 650-54 (1966).
49 The Court agreed with Lowenfels in concluding that Rule 405 could fit under Section 27
as a "duty increased by this chapter," Buitrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142 (1969), and adopted his test that the determining factor is
whether the rule is "for the direct protection of the investors." Id. It joined with this
factor relied on in Colonial as to whether the rule "play[s] an integral part in SEC
regulation." Id. The court agreed with the opinion in Hecht that "mere errors in judgment
by the defendant might not support a federal cause of action .... " Id. at 143.
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of Rule 405 is per se actionable,"" ° but looked to the alleged conduct
of the defendant and found it "tantamount to fraud on the bank-
rupt's customers, thus giving rise to a private civil damage action."
5'
Consequently, under the Buttrey decision, whether a particular rule
of the NYSE can be the basis for a civil liability depends on the
nature of the alleged violation of the rule. If the violation is mere
unethical conduct, it appears that it would not give rise to civil
liability, while if it is "tantamount to fraud," liability will be im-
posed, 2 and this decision cannot be made until the case has been
heard on its merits.
53
The result in Buttrey is clearly in conflict with Hecht and
Mercury in that these cases denied liability under a rule if its scope
included merely unethical or negligent conduct. The Buttrey view
would presumably fail to satisfy author Lowenfels who urges civil
liability for violation of a rule if it was passed for the protection
of investors, 5 without any requirement that the alleged activity be
tantamount to fraud." Additionally, Buttrey essentially ignores the
considerations behind the rule by rule approach set forth in Colonial
to prevent excessive federal civil actions.
5
5
III. THE SELF-REGULATORY SCHEME
Since it appears that there is no controlling precedent or clear
statutory mandate to resolve the issue of broker's civil liability for
violation of an exchange or association rule, it is logical to examine
the structure of the regulatory scheme and the roles and functions
of the self-regulatory bodies to determine if such liability is consistent
with the scheme.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for three distinct
but complimentary methods of achieving the protection of the public
investor in the securities markets. The first, of course, is the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission5" which has statutory responsibility
50
1d. at 142.
51 Id. at 143.
5
2 Id.
53 "Until this case is actually tried, it will be impossible to ascertain whether defendant has
violated Rule 405, and if so, whether the violations justify the imposition of liability." Id.
54 See note 48, supra.
5 See note 36, supra.
5 The Commission was established pursuant to Section 4(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1964).
1970
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for enforcing the Act.5" Secondly, the Act provides for civil liability
for violation of several of its sections.5"
The third method of achieving investor protection is the regu-
lation of broker-dealers through self-regulatory bodies registered with
the Commission. The courts in Colonial, Hecht and Buttrey all relied
on their understanding of the concept of self-regulation in reaching
their conclusions, and thus it is important to examine the rationale
behind the concept and the present understanding of its function in
the overall scheme.
According to the Report of Special Study of the Securities
Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission,59 there are three
primary reasons for self-regulation in the securities industry:
(1) Expediency and practicality in recognition of "the sheer
ineffectiveness of attempting to assure [regulation] directly
through Government on a wide scale;"6
(2) The value of the expertise and experience that members of a
complex and intricate industry can bring to bear; 6 and,
(3) The necessity of going beyond the reaches of the law and
regulating the ethical behavior of the member of the
industry.62
Coupled with these reasons was the assumption that the self-regu-
lators would require a quasi-independent status to operate effectively.
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,63 the only major judicial
exploration of the concept of self-regulation in the securities industry,
the Supreme Court was faced with the problem of the applicability
of the antitrust laws to self-regulation under the Act.64 In its con-
57 The Commission has the power to pass rules and regulations necessary to carry out its
function under the Act. Securities Exchange Act § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1964).
To enforce the statute and the rules and regulations the SEC has the authority to: (1)
Seek injunctive relief in United States District Court, Securities Exchange Act § 21(e),
15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964) ; (2) Refer the matter to the Department of Justice with a
recommendation of criminal prosecution; Securities Exchange Act § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. §
78u(e) (1964) ; (3) Institute administrative proceedings against registered broker-dealers
to deny, suspend or revoke their registration, Securities Exchange Act § 15 (a) (3) 15
U.S.C. § 78o(a)(5) (1964).
58 Section 9 of the Act gives a cause of action to any person buying or selling a security
at a price affected by the manipulative actions described therein. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964),
Section 18(a) gives a cause of action to anyone damaged by reliance on false reports or
petition required by the Act to be filed with the Commission, the exchanges or the NASD.
15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964). And Section 16(b) of the Act sets forth civil liabilities
relating to insider trading. 15 US.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
59H.R. Doc. No. 95 Pt. 4, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter referred to as Specia!
Study].
60Special Study, 693, quoting Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 514 (1934).
61 Special Study at 693-94.
62 1d. at 694-95.
63373 U.S. 341 (1963).
64 Id. at 342-43.
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sideration of the issue, the Court affirmed the principle that the
self-regulators must be allowed to take the initiative and be given
the primary responsibility for the regulation of their members' con-
duct. The government should retain a residual control but act with
restraint in employing it only when the exchanges and the NASD
fail to meet their responsibility. 6
5
The Special Study approves the principle of self-regulatory
autonomy with governmental oversights. The term "cooperative regu-
lation"66 is used to express the idea that "the roles of the self-
regulatory agencies and the Commission are essentially complementary,
and it would follow that self-regulatory agencies must enjoy such
degree of autonomy as will enable them to act as responsible, dynamic
partners in a cooperative enterprise."6 7
Stated very simply, if the self-regulatory bodies are to perform
their purpose, they must operate within a structure allowing them
to assume the initiative and responsibility for the task. They "cannot
be expected to exercise the full measure of responsibility if the
Commission is looking over their shoulder[s] and directing or second-
guessing each individual action" 68 that they take.
The purpose of self-regulation thus conceived is to delegate part
of the regulatory function to a second regulatory body in the
securities industry, with its areas of responsibility and its powers
delineated. Its function of supervised independence is distinct from,
but complementary to, the role of the Commission. The correct balance
of government control and self-regulatory independence must be
maintained if the self-regulators are "to act as responsible, dynamic
partners in a cooperative enterprise,''" the ultimate goal of which is
investor protection.
The essential question then is what effect will the imposition of
civil liability for violation of the rules of these agencies have upon
65 The Court quoted in full Mr. Justice (then Commission Chairman) Douglas' remark that
the intention of self-regulation was one of "letting the exchanges take the leadership with
government playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak,
behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would
never have to be used." Id. at 352. The quote is from W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND
FINANCE 82 (Allen ed. 1940). The Court then quoted a Senate Committee report stating
that "[Tihe initiative and responsibility for promulgating regulations pertaining to the
administration of their ordinary affairs remain with the exchanges themselves. It is only
where they fail adequately to provide protection to investors that the Commission is
authorized to step in and compel them to do so." Id.. citing S. Rep. No. 782, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1934). Mr. Justice Stewart in a dissenting opinion affirmed the principle
in his statement that "Ithe purpose of the self-regulation provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act was to delegate governmental power to working institutions which would
undertake, at their own initiative, to enforce compliance with ethical as well as legal
standards in a complex and changing industry." Id. at 371.
66 Special Study at 701.
67 Id. at 702.
68 Id. at 703.
6 9 Id. at 702.
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this balance of supervision and independence. One of the inherent
limitations in the concept of self-regulation is the potential reluctance
of the members of the industry to enforce their rules and discipline
themselves. The fact that the motivation of the industry may be one
of self-interest coupled with what the Special Study refers to as "the
weakness of human nature"7 raises the real possibility that "self-
regulators might not always be as diligent as might be desired, might
indeed use self-regulation as a device to avoid regulation altogether."171
One can only speculate what the effect would be on the rule making
of the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange if they
were aware that in adopting a rule they were in effect creating new
grounds on which their members could be sued in federal court.
Common sense dictates that such a consideration would not exactly
encourage their taking the initiative in adopting new rules regulating
the conduct of their members, and it is not unlikely that it would
have a definite restrictive effect. The Special Study evidenced a
similar concern over the effect of the Silver decision on the effec-
tiveness of self-regulation. The application of the antitrust laws to
"what the Exchange asserted to be a necessary exercise of its self-
regulatory responsibilities [presented] a grave threat to the scope
and viability of self-regulation .... .I' The threat lay in exchanges
being "subject to the inflexible and potentially harsh sanctions of
ordinary lawsuits, particularly treble damage suits in performing
what they may in good faith regard as necessary self-regulation.""
The spectre of unlimited lawsuits against their members based on
their own rules would appear to pose a similar threat to the inde-
pendence and integrity of the self-regulatory bodies. Whether the
regulators want to create a new civil liability should not be relevant
to the deliberative process in considering the adoption of a new rule.
Another basic principle of self-regulation is that it encompasses
and regulates the ethical behavior of the members. The use of the
phrase "just and equitable principles of trade" has been previously
mentioned as one of the primary statutory standards of self-regu-
7
0 Id. at 722.
71 Id. at 695. The Special Study is replete with instances of laxity in rule-making and
enforcement by the self-regulators. See, e.g., id. at 669-70. The most notorious example,
of course, was the condition of the American Stock Exchange in 1961 as detailed in a
Commission Staff Report. Staff Report on Organization, Management, and Regulation of
Conduct of Members of the American Stock Exchange. This report is contained in the
Special Study as Appendix XII-A, at 751. The conclusion of the report is harsh: "There
can be little doubt that in the case of the American Stock Exchange the statutory scheme
of self-regulation in the public interest has not worked out in the manner originally
envisioned by Congress. The manifold and prolonged abuses . . . make it clear that the
problem goes beyond isolated violations and amounts to a general deficiency of standards
and a fundamental failure of controls." Id. at 53, Special Study at 805.




lation, 4 and it is apparent from the history of the Act that it was
intended to place the obligation of passing and enforcing rules
governing legal but unethical behavior on the self-regulators.75
There were two major reasons for initially delegating the re-
sponsibility of regulating ethical conduct to the self-regulators: (1)
There was a growing recognition of the need to professionalize the
securities industry; and (2) it was clear that the government was
unable to establish and enforce ethical standards of conduct for that
purpose.6
The Special Study concluded that professionalization of the in-
dustry through promulgation and enforcement of high ethical stan-
dards "represents the highest of all goals of self-regulation"77 and
the study recognized that "[a]lmost by hypothesis, this goal is be-
yond the reach of law and regulation in the ordinary sense. '"78
Two cases have recognized this role of self-regulation in refusing
civil liability for violation of the "suitability rule" on the basis that
it proscribed ethical as well as non-fraudulent conduct. 9
The combination of these principles of self-regulation yields the
conclusion that in order to effectively regulate ethical conduct in
the securities industry, the self-regulatory bodies must operate in a
structure of supervised independence. The issue of civil liability for
violation of these rules must be viewed in terms of the effect it would
have on self -regulation thus conceived and on the over-all regulatory
scheme. The results of lax self-regulation have already been seen."0
It is improbable that holding members of an exchange or association
civilly liable for the violation of their rules could have any sort of
positive or constructive effect on the performance by the self-regu-
latory bodies in promulgating such rules. It is more probable, rather,
74 See note 13, supra.
75 As one court has put it: "There is a large area for the operation of exchange rules on the
level of business ethics rather than law and in that sphere the statute leaves it to the
exchanges to carry on the necessary work of preventive discipline." Avery v. Moffatt, 187
Misc. 576, 55 N.Y.S.2d 215, 228 (1945).
7 Mr. Justice Douglas pinpointed the purposes of self-regulation in a speech in 1938:
"First, self-discipline in conformity to law voluntary law obedience so complete that
there is nothing left for government representatives to do; -second- . . . obedience
to ethical standards beyond those any law can establish." In explanation of the second
purpose, Justice Douglas said:
By and large, government can operate satisfactorily only by proscription. That
leaves untouched large areas of conduct and activity; some of it susceptible of
government regulation but in fact too minute for satisfactory control; some of
it lying beyond the periphery of the law in the realm of ethics and morality.
Into these large areas self-government, and self-government alone, can effectively
reach.
Address before the Bond Club of Hartford, Conn., January 7, 1938, as cited in Special
Study at 694-95.
77 Special Study at 695.
78 Id.
79 See notes 39 & 42, supra and accompanying text.
80 See note 71, supra.
1970
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
that it could have an inhibitive effect similar to that envisioned by
the Special Study.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE TEST
Although to date most of the suits against broker-dealers for
violation of exchange or association rules have been based on the
violation of the "suitability" and "know your customer" rules, the
decision in the Buttrey case will most certainly lead to an examination
of the remainder of the rules for possible use as grounds for civil
action. The test proposed by author Lowenfels and partially adopted
by the court in Colonial and Buttrey requires a determination of
whether a particular rule was adopted for the "direct protection of
investors" or was merely a housekeeping rule. If the former, there
is a strong if not controlling reason for allowing the investor to sue
for a violation of the rule. However, what seemingly would be a rela-
tively easy factual determination becomes more difficult in application
and in some instances leads to incongruous results.
For example, Rule 403 of the NYSE provides in part that no
member shall be directly or indirectly associated with or transact
business with "any bucket shop.''81 It is easily arguable that one of the
purposes of this rule is to protect the members of the member firm
by prohibiting the firm from dealing with bucket shops, which generally
are defined as firms engaging in questionable selling practices in
speculative securities.8 2 Assume that a NYSE firm purchases a security
for a customer at his request, and that the security can only be obtained
from bucket shops. The price of the security falls rapidly and the
customer sues the representative and the firm for violation of Rule 403.
Assuming that the court would somehow be able to fashion a definition
of a "bucket shop" should the customer be allowed to recover solely
on the basis that he could not have purchased the security if the firm
had obeyed the rule?83
For instance, one of the difficult areas which may arise concerns
rules adopted by the exchange which the Commission is without
81 New York Stock Exchange Rule 403, CCH New York Stock Exchange Guide 1i 2403.
82 See 1 IOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 39 (1961).
83 Another example would be Rule 346 of the New York Stock Exchange which generally
provides that a registered representative shall not engage in any other business without
exchange approval and must devote his full time during business hours to the business of
the member firm. New York Stock Exchange Rule 346, CCH New York Stock Exchange
Guide 2346. Here again, it could easily be concluded that one of the purposes of the rule
was to protect the customers on the theory that a representative would be better informed
and provide better service if he devoted all of his energies to the brokerage business.
Assume that an unexpected low earnings report for a security held by a customer was
announced on an afternoon when the representative was interviewing for a position with
another brokerage firm. Assume that the price fell rapidly and the customer could demon-
strate that those who sold that afternoon did not suffer near the loss of those who sold, as
he did, the next morning. Should he be allowed to sue and recover solely on the grounds
that had the representative been in the office at the time of the announcement and
informed the customer, he would have sold sooner and not suffered such a loss?
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authority to adopt. Where such a rule is clearly promulgated for the
protection of investors, a customer could theoretically sue in federal
court on a rule which at least in some instances Congress has refused
to give the Commission the authority to adopt .
4
CONCLUSION
Since there appears to be no controlling or even persuasive statu-
tory theory or case law regarding the question of civil liability for
brokers for violation of association and exchange rules, the broader
area of public policy must be relied on for guiding principles. The
primary goal of regulation in the securities field is the protection of
the public investor, and as stated earlier, Congress has attempted to
achieve this by a combination of civil liability, government enforcement,
and self-regulation. It is a relatively intricate regulatory scheme with
its over-all effectiveness depending in large measure on an integrated
balance of the three segments. Imposing civil liabilities for violation of
exchange and association rules raises the very real possibility of up-
setting this balance -by affecting the vigor and motivation with which
the self-regulators perform their functions.
No case has been made that the ultimate goal of investor pro-
tection is being obstructed by inadequate civil remedies for investors
against brokers. In view of this, and in view of the possible consequences
of accomplishing this goal by further expanding civil liabilities, it is
urged that public policy does not require the imposition of civil lia-
bilities for violations of self-regulatory rules. To the contrary, policy
considerations would seem to weigh against imposition of such liabilities
if self-regulation, particularly in regard to the ethical conduct of
the members, is to function effectively to achieve maximum investor
protection.
84 The Commission has never adopted rules regulating physical segregation of customers'
securities by brokerage firms, although it proposed legislative amendments in 1941,
1956 and 1959 requesting the authority to do so. However, the New York Stock Exchange
has adopted rules requiring segregation of customers' fully paid and excess margin
securities. There can be little question that these rules requiring identification of custom-
ers' securities were passed for the direct protection of investors.
Under the test, a customer could sue a broker for the losses resulting from the
broker's failure to properly segregate his securities in violation of the rule.
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